Readings POLSC 4 — World Politics (Fall 2013)

Dr. Donald Douglas, LBCC, Fall 2013 POLSC 4 

World Politics – Take-Home Essay Assignment

Students are to write a 4-6 page essay, double spaced with 10- or 12-point font, stapled in the upper left-hand corner. The topic is for students to evaluate possible U.S. military intervention in Syria using international relations theory. Students should focus on the following questions: What’s the U.S. interest in Syria? Is this a “vital national interest” or something else? How will American security be advanced by war in Syria? Apply international relations theories to evaluate those questions from different perspectives. And use the following readings for your essay: Michael Crowley, “The Syria Problem (Printer Version)," Time (Sept. 09, 2013); Erica Borghard “Arms and Influence in Syria: The Pitfalls of Greater U.S. Involvement,” Cato Institute (August 7, 2013); Anthony Cordesman, “U.S. Strategy in Syria: Having Lost Sight of the Objective…”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (September 12, 2013); Charli Carpenter, “Responsibility to Protect — Or to Punish: Morality and the Intervention in Syria,” Foreign Affairs (August 29, 2013); Frederick Kagan, “What to Do About Syria,” Weekly Standard (September 13, 2013); and “Experts to Obama: Here Is What to Do in Syria,” Weekly Standard (August 27, 2013). (All readings are available online and will be posted at the class blog and announced in class.)

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Dr. Donald K. Douglas
Long Beach City College: Fall 2013
Office Location: T2361
Office Hours: M-W 10:05-11:05am; T-TH 2:30-4:00pm
E-mail: ddouglas [at] lbcc.edu

Course Outline and Reading Assignments:

I. The Study of World Politics (August 26, 28 and September 4)

James M. Scott, Ralph G. Carter, and A. Cooper Drury, IR (Boston: Wadsworth, 2014), Chapter 1.
Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy (November/December 2004).

II. Anarchy, States and Non-State Actors (September 9 and 11)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 2.
Kenneth Waltz, “The Anarchic Structure of World Politics” (1979), in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues.
Jessica Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 1997).

III. Liberalism and Realism (September 16)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 3.
John Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne et al., eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Realism and Complex Interdependence,” Chapter 2, in Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition (2001).


 *** Midterm Examination – September 18 ***


IV. Alternative Perspectives on IR (September 23 and 25)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 4.
Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization (Spring 1984), especially pp. 225-230 and 237-281.
Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization (Spring 1992), especially pp., 391-395, 403-407,and the conclusion.
Andrés Velasco, "The Dustbin of History: Dependency Theory," Foreign Policy (November/December 2002).
J. Ann Tickner, "Engendered Insecurities: Feminist Perspectives on International Relations," in Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (1992).

V. Understanding Conflict and War (September 30 and October 2)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 5.
Joshua Goldstein, "Think Again: War," Foreign Policy (September/October 2011).


 *** Midterm Examination – October 7 ***


VI. International Conflict Management (October 9 and 14)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 6.
John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security (Spring 1986).
Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security (Summer 1991), especially pp. 113-137.

VII. International Institutions and Security Cooperation (October 16 and 21)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 7.
Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence" in Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder, eds., Essential Readings in World Politics.
Madeleine Albright, "Think Again: The United Nations," Foreign Policy (September/October 2003).

VIII. Trade, Finance, and Economic Integration (October 23 and 28)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 8.
Helen Milner, "International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability," Foreign Policy (Spring 1998).
Benjamin J. Cohen, "Currency and State Power," in Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, eds., Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford University Press, 2013).


*** Midterm Examination – October 30 ***


IX. Economic Statecraft (November 4 and 6)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 9.
George A. Lopez and David Cortright, "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2004).
Charles Kenny and Justin Sandefur, "Can Silicon Valley Save the World?" Foreign Policy (July/August 2013).

X. Political Economy and Development (November 13 and 18)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 10.
Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," Monthly Review (September 1966).
"The Failure of Economic Development: Interview with William Easterly," Challenge (January/February 2002).
David Dollar and Aart Kraay, "Spreading the Wealth," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002).
Ruchir Sharma, "Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising," Foreign Affairs (November/December 2012).

XI. Human Rights (November 20 and 25)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 11.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The Politics of Human Rights," Commentary (August 1977).
Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights," PS: Political Science and Politics (September 1998).


*** Midterm Examination – November 27 ***


XII. The Global Environment (December 2)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 12.
Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science (1968).
Bjørn Lomborg, "Environmental Alarmism, Then and Now. The Club of Rome's Problem – and Ours," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2012).
Steven Hayward, "In Denial: The Meltdown of the Climate Campaign," Weekly Standard (2010).

XIII. Transitional Advocacy Networks (December 4)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 13.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics," International Social Science Journal (March 1999).

XIV. The Future of World Politics (December 9)

Scott, Carter and Drury, IR, Chapter 14.
Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993).
Robert Kagan, "History's Back. Ambitious Autocracies, Hesitant Democracies," Weekly Standard (August 2008).

*** Final Examination – December 11 ***

Republican Voters Shifting to Protectionism

A new Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll shows Republican voters growing increasingly skeptical of free trade policies:

By a nearly two-to-one margin, Republican voters believe free trade is bad for the U.S. economy, a shift in opinion that mirrors Democratic views and suggests trade deals could face high hurdles under a new president....

Six in 10 Republicans in the poll agreed with a statement that free trade has been bad for the U.S. and said they would agree with a Republican candidate who favored tougher regulations to limit foreign imports. That represents a challenge for Republican candidates who generally echo Mr. Bush's calls for continued trade expansion, and reflects a substantial shift in sentiment from eight years ago.

Take a look at the article. In my view, the findings of GOP unease with free trade reflect a broader unhappiness with the greater forces of globalization, and especially GOP concerns surrounding illegal immigration and border security (48 percent of Republicans oppose the administration's proposal for a guest worker program). The survey indicates a breakdown of the conservative concensus on economic and regulatory policies. For example, the survey finds a plurality of Republicans supporting tax increases to fund health care and other items:

In part, the concern about trade reflected in the survey reflects the changing composition of the Republican electorate as social conservatives have grown in influence. In questions about a series of candidate stances, the only one drawing strong agreement from a majority of Republicans was opposition to abortion rights.

Post-9/11 security concerns have also displaced some of the traditional economic concerns of the Republican Party that Ronald Reagan reshaped a generation ago. Asked which issues will be most important in determining their vote, a 32% plurality cited national defense, while 25% cited domestic issues such as education and health care, and 23% cited moral issues. Ranking last, identified by just 17%, were economic issues such as taxes and trade.

The WSJ poll appears to buttress some of the findings from the Washington Post's recent survey, which found increasing numbers of business professionals shifting to the Democratic Party.

The Republican shift on trade policy is a toubling development for American international economic policy. A shift toward protectionism - perhaps under a new Democratic administration in 2009 - is the last thing the U.S. needs. Since World War II, the U.S.-led liberal international trade and monetary regimes have provided the economic foundations for world growth and prosperity. Both developed and less-developed nations thrive on open markets and access to the diversity of the world goods and human resources. Rising protectionism threatens these achievements.

In a 2005 Foreign Affairs article, Carla A. Hills, who was U.S. Trade Representative during the G.H.W. Bush administration, reviewed the stakes involved in the continued push for trade expansion:

The U.S. experience since World War II proves that increased economic interdependence boosts economic growth and encourages political stability. For more than 50 years, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States has led the world in opening markets. To that end, the United States worked to establish a series of international organizations, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)....

The results to date have been spectacular. World trade has exploded and standards of living have soared at home and abroad. Economist Gary Hufbauer, in a comprehensive study published this year by the Institute of International Economics, calculates that 50 years of globalization has made the United States richer by $1 trillion per year (measured in 2003 dollars), or about $9,000 added wealth per year for the average U.S. household. Developing countries have also gained from globalization. On average, poor countries that have opened their markets to trade and investment have grown five times faster than those that kept their markets closed. Studies conducted by World Bank economist David Dollar show that globalization has raised 375 million people out of extreme poverty over the past 20 years.

And the benefits have not been only economic. As governments liberalize their trade regimes, they often liberalize their political regimes. Adherence to a set of trade rules encourages transparency, the rule of law, and a respect for property that contribute to increased stability. Without U.S. leadership...the world would look very different today.

The United States has an interest in continuing this progress. Republican voters worried about the effects of trade on their economic well-being have legitimate fears, although ultimately the gains from trade will exceed the pain incurred by trade-induced economic dislocation. Candidates in the GOP presidential field need to provide public leadership on this issue, rousing the party's base to a greater understanding of the benefits of international trade openness. Recent Democratic Party statements in favor of trade policy protectionism present a much more damaging alternative to the American economy in the long run.

Israel and the Syria Raid: Implications for Iran

This week's Newsweek provides some compelling speculation on the implications of last week's secretive raid on Syria, the target of which Israel has claimed was a nuclear development facility. Check it out:

How far will Israel go to keep Iran from getting the bomb? The question gained new urgency this month when Israeli warplanes carried out a mysterious raid deep in Syria and then threw up a nearly impenetrable wall of silence around the operation. Last week opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu chipped away at that wall, saying Israel did in fact attack targets in Syrian territory. His top adviser, Mossad veteran Uzi Arad, told NEWSWEEK: "I do know what happened, and when it comes out it will stun everyone."

Official silence has prompted a broad range of speculation as to what exactly took place. One former U.S. official, who like others quoted in this article declined to be identified discussing sensitive matters, says several months ago Israel presented the Bush administration with reconnaissance images and information from secret agents alleging North Korea had begun to supply nuclear-related material to Syria. Some U.S. intelligence reporting, including electronic signal intercepts, appeared to support the Israeli claims. But other U.S. officials remain skeptical about any nuclear link between Syria and North Korea. One European security source told NEWSWEEK the target might have been a North Korean military shipment to Iran that was transiting Syria. But a European intelligence official said it wasn't certain Israel had struck anything at all.

While the Bush administration appears to have given tacit support to the Syria raid, Israel and the United States are not in lockstep on Iran. For Israel, the next three months may be decisive: either Tehran succumbs to sanctions and stops enriching uranium or it must be dealt with militarily. (Iran says its program is for peaceful purposes only.) "Two thousand seven is the year you determine whether diplomatic efforts will stop Iran," says a well-placed Israeli source, who did not want to be named because he is not authorized to speak for the government. "If by the end of the year that's not working, 2008 becomes the year you take action."

In Washington, on the other hand, the consensus against a strike is firmer than most people realize. The Pentagon worries that another war will break America's already overstretched military, while the intelligence community believes Iran is not yet on the verge of a nuclear breakthrough. The latter assessment is expected to appear in a secret National Intelligence Estimate currently nearing completion, according to three intelligence officials who asked for anonymity when discussing nonpublic material. The report is expected to say Iran will not be able to build a nuclear bomb until at least 2010 and possibly 2015. One explanation for the lag: Iran is having trouble with its centrifuge-enrichment technology, according to U.S. and European officials.

Douglas Frantz of the Los Angeles Times noted in 2004, however, that Iran was moving toward nuclear readiness:

This month, Iran said it was gearing up to produce large amounts of gaseous uranium, which is used in enrichment. The gas, known as uranium hexafluoride, can be fed into slender centrifuges, which spin at high speed to transform the gas into enriched uranium.

Iran has moved much faster than expected in manufacturing and assembling these centrifuges, diplomats said. The rapid progress means a pilot centrifuge plant near Natanz, in central Iran, could soon be equipped with enough machines to begin large-scale enrichment.

Two senior European diplomats said the pilot plant could be expanded from the existing 164 centrifuges to 1,000 within weeks and produce enough material in less than a year to fashion a crude nuclear device.

The exact timing involved in Iran's nuclear preparations is probably less important than the regime's overall intentions. Ahmadinejad has rebuffed the Security Council on the issue of continuing inspections, and the world body has delayed a vote on tougher sanctions until at least November, a move designed to give Mohamed ElBaradei - the chief IAEA inspector - more time to investigate Iranian compliance with international demands for a halt to enrichment activities.

Israel might not wait too long, particularly as more information on the ultimate significance of the Syrian incursion becomes available. As the Newsweek story indicates:

The Jewish state has cause for worry. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vows regularly to destroy the country; former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, considered a moderate, warned in 2001 that Tehran could do away with Israel with just one nuclear bomb. In Tel Aviv last week, former deputy Defense minister Ephraim Sneh concurred. Sneh, a dovish member of Israel's Parliament and a retired brigadier general, took a NEWSWEEK reporter to the observation deck atop the 50-story Azrieli Center. "There is Haifa just over the horizon, Ben-Gurion airport over there, the Defense Ministry down below," he said, to show how small the country is. "You can see in this space the majority of our intellectual, economic, political assets are concentrated. One nuclear bomb is enough to wipe out Israel."

The logistics of an Irsraeli attack on Iran's program are difficult but not prohibitive (see here, for example). One interesting scenario - suggested in the Newsweek report - is that an Israeli preventive attack results in Iran's retaliation, with the possible targeting of American assets, which would likely pull the U.S. into the conflict.

What War on Terrorism?

Mark Stein has an interesting commentary in today's Orange County Register. Steyn reminds us that this week's six-year anniversary of 9/11 will be the first time since the attacks that remembrances will fall on a Tuesday morning, the day of the week we were hit by the Islamists.

But to reflect on the state of American popular perception, goes Steyn, you'd hardly know there's a war against terrorism going on:

Six years on, most Americans are now pretty certain what they'll wake up to in the morning: There'll be a thwarted terrorist plot somewhere or other – last week, it was Germany. Occasionally, one will succeed somewhere or other, on the far horizon – in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, London. But not many folks expect to switch on the TV this Tuesday morning, as they did that Tuesday morning, and see smoke billowing from Atlanta or Phoenix or Seattle. During the IRA's 30-year campaign, the British grew accustomed (perhaps too easily accustomed) to waking up to the news either of some prominent person's assassination or that a couple of grandmas and some schoolkids had been blown apart in a shopping center. It was a terrorist war in which terrorism was almost routine. But, in the six years since President Bush declared that America was in a "war on terror," there has been in America no terrorism.

In theory, the administration ought to derive a political benefit from this: The president has "kept America safe." But, in practice, the placidity of the domestic front diminishes the chosen rationale of the conflict: if a "war on terror" has no terror, who says there's a war at all? That's the argument of the left – that it's all a racket cooked up by the Bushitlerburton fascists to impose on America a permanent national-security state in which, for dark sinister reasons of his own, Dick Cheney is free to monitor your out-of-state phone calls all day long.

Read the whole thing. Steyn notes that a majority of Americans thinks Bush knew something about the attacks in advance. Indeed, for Steyn, our culture's been taken over by conspiracies of 9/11, rather than cold, hard thinking about the current correlation of forces in international affairs.

Bound to Fall? The Coming End of U.S Imperialism

I don't love the "America-as-empire" meme. But as Dan Nexon points out in the comments to my "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate?" thread, it's a pretty well-developed line of thought.

David Rieff picks up a bit more on the theme in today's Los Angeles Times:

In Washington these days, people talk a lot about the collapse of the bipartisan foreign policy consensus that existed during the Cold War. But however bitter today's disputes are about Iraq or the prosecution of the so-called global war on terrorism, there is one bedrock assumption about foreign policy that remains truly bipartisan: The United States will remain the sole superpower, and the guarantor of international security and global trade, for the foreseeable future. In other words, whatever else may change in the decades to come, the 21st century will be every bit as much of an American century as the 20th.

This assumption rests, in turn, on two interrelated beliefs. The first is that because no country or alliance of states has shown any great desire to challenge U.S. preeminence -- or demonstrated the means of doing so -- no country is going to....

The second is that the world needs the U.S. and appreciates the role it plays. (In some versions of this argument, the world needs the U.S. far more than the U.S. needs the world.) If there have been no serious challenges to American hegemony to date, it is asserted, it is because the U.S. provides what are referred to by foreign policy analysts as "global goods": It maintains political and economic stability around the world, it guarantees a democratic capitalist world order and, by virtue of its unparalleled military strength, it acts as a world policeman of last resort.

Rieff appears up on his international relations theory. But more interesting is his expectation of impending U.S. imperial decline:

It is hardly farfetched to scan the historical record and conclude that self-love and imperialism go together, whether it was the British imperialist Cecil Rhodes insisting that British colonialism in Africa had been "philanthropy plus 5%" or President Bush insisting that it was America's special mission to spread democracy throughout the world. But what the historical record also shows is that imperial moments are, in fact, fleeting, and that hegemony has a shorter and shorter shelf life. The Roman Empire lasted more than 700 years (more than a millennium if you count the Byzantines); the British Empire lasted a little more than 300 years in India and less than a century in much of Africa. The economic challenges facing the U.S. at least suggest that America's time as sole superpower could be shorter still.

Americans, who grow up believing in their country's exceptionalism (which in foreign policy terms often seems to mean not believing that the historical constraints that apply to other nations apply to the U.S.), are not predisposed to believe that American predominance could possibly be coming to an end. And yet it seems more like wishful thinking than rational analysis to believe that the United States -- which in the coming decades will certainly have to adapt to a multipolar world in geo-economic terms, as China and India reoccupy the central place in the global economy that they had 500 years ago -- can continue indefinitely to play a hegemonic role.

I don't discount Rieff's argument in the least (that is, on the eventual decine of U.S leadership - I don't think we're an empire though). The U.S. cannot sustain primacy forever. But depending on one's research reference, it might still be decades - if not centuries - before America's international leadership is challenged (and the country is dislodged from its hegemonic position).

I've blogged a lot about this. However, one of the best recent scholarly arguments on the future of American primacy is Mark L. Haas', "A Geriatric Peace: The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations."

My entry on the Haas piece is here (I think he makes an excellent case for the demographic bases of continued U.S. preponderance). But see also my entry on Fareed Zakaria, who looks at continued U.S. economic and techological dynamism as the foundation for long-term American primacy.

Fortress America? The New U.S. Embassy in Iraq

The September/October issue of Foreign Policy has a very interesting article on the new U.S. diplomatic embassy in Iraq. The author, Jane C. Loeffler, notes that while this is the most well-protected embassy installation ever designed and built, can we actually practice diplomacy in such a fortress?

For security reasons, many details about the embassy’s design and construction must remain classified. But the broad outline of its layout says a lot about one of America’s most important architectural projects. Located in Baghdad’s 4-square-mile Green Zone, the embassy will occupy 104 acres. It will be six times larger than the U.N. complex in New York and more than 10 times the size of the new U.S. Embassy being built in Beijing, which at 10 acres is America’s second-largest mission. The Baghdad compound will be entirely self-sufficient, with no need to rely on the Iraqis for services of any kind. The embassy has its own electricity plant, fresh water and sewage treatment facilities, storage warehouses, and maintenance shops. The embassy is composed of more than 20 buildings, including six apartment complexes with 619 one-bedroom units. Two office blocks will accomodate about 1,000 employees. High-ranking diplomats will enjoy well-appointed private residences. Once inside the compound, Americans will have almost no reason to leave. It will have a shopping market, food court, movie theater, beauty salon, gymnasium, swimming pool, tennis courts, a school, and an American Club for social gatherings. To protect it all, the embassy is reportedly surrounded by a wall at least 9 feet high—and it has its own defense force. The U.S. Congress has appropriated $592 million for the embassy’s construction, though some estimates put the expected building costs much higher. Once built, it could cost as much as $1 billion a year to run. Charles E. Williams, who directs the State Department’s Overseas Buildings Operations, proudly refers to it as “the largest U.S. mission ever built.”

But, the idea of an embassy this huge, this costly, and this isolated from events taking place outside its walls is not necessarily a cause for celebration. Traditionally, at least, embassies were designed to further interaction with the community in which they were built. Diplomats visited the offices of local government officials, shopped at local businesses, took their suits to the neighborhood dry cleaner, socialized with community leaders, and mixed with the general public. Diplomacy is not the sort of work that can be done by remote control. It takes direct contact to build goodwill for the United States and promote democratic values. Otherwise, there would be no reason for the United States to maintain its 250-plus diplomatic posts around the world. The embassy in Baghdad, however, appears to represent a sea change in U.S. diplomacy. Although U.S. diplomats will technically be “in Iraq,” they may as well be in Washington. Judging by the embassy’s design, planners were thinking more in terms of a frontier outpost than a facility engaged with its community. “The embassy,” says Edward L. Peck, the former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, “is going to have a thousand people hunkered behind sandbags. I don’t know how you conduct diplomacy in that way.”

It is tempting to think that the Baghdad compound must be an anomaly, a special circumstance dictated by events on the ground in Iraq. But, while it is larger in scope than other U.S. embassies opening around the world, it is hardly unique. Since al Qaeda bombed the American missions in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the State Department has been aggressively replacing obsolete or vulnerable embassies with ones designed under a program it calls Standard Embassy Design. The program mandates look-alike embassies, not the boldly individual designs built during the Cold War, when architecture played an important ideological role and U.S. embassies were functionally and architecturally open. The United States opened 14 newly built embassies last year alone, and long-range plans call for 76 more, including 12 to be completed this year. The result will be a radical redesign of the diplomatic landscape—not only in Baghdad, but in Bamako, Belmopan, Cape Town, Dushanbe, Kabul, Lomé, and elsewhere.

If architecture reflects the society that creates it, the new U.S. embassy in Baghdad makes a devastating comment about America’s global outlook. Although the U.S. government regularly proclaims confidence in Iraq’s democratic future, the United States has designed an embassy that conveys no confidence in Iraqis and little hope for their future. Instead, the United States has built a fortress capable of sustaining a massive, long-term presence in the face of continued
violence.

I think Loeffler raises important points about how the new facility elucidates a larger bunker mentality at work in the foreign service, and American national security more broadly.

Still, while the scope of massive protection built into the mission might indeed make a larger statement about American society, at the immediate level of protection for American personnel, I don't know if we as a country would have it any other way. We're committed to our Iraq project, and the most barbarian attacks on our infrastructure there will have a hard time dislodging us from consolidating some semblance of democratic order in the country.

What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate: The Same Old Empty Jargon of Legions and Gunboats?

I've been meaning to put up an entry reviewing Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright's article, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate?" (PDF) , which appeared in the May 2007 volume of the American Political Science Review. Frankly, I took my time getting around to finishing the piece, and I've been mulling around a way to rebut the major points raised by the research.

First, I'd like to congratulate the authors, and especially Dan - who's an occasional commenter on this blog - for their outstanding academic achievement. Publishing in the APSR remains the top scholarly accomplishment in the discipline of political science (or at least it was back in the early 2000s, shortly after I landed my current academic post). By its publication in this flagship journal, the authors work has been deemed to represent the highest standards of exposition, craftsmanship, and rigor in the field, and their efforts no doubt further such important professionals goals as tenure and promotion. Great job!

That said, let me get right into their paper and my thoughts on its contents.

Nexon and Wright wade into the debate over American foreign policy and "the unipolar moment" by posing (essentially) this question: Can America's standing in global politics best be described as unipolor dominance of the balance-of-power system, hegemonic mastery of the international realm, or an imperial order?

The authors argue that unipolarity and hegemony as theoretical paradigms fail to capture substantial "imperial properties" that characterize America's relations to the other nation-state actors - large and small - in international life. The article employs an "ideal-typifying" approach that seeks to find generalized patterns of great power politics and hierarchy, using the American case as a key test for how well the "logics" of imperialism explain contemporary world political dynamics.

Here's a brief summary of their main theoretical thrust:

We argue that ideal-typical empires...differ from hegemonic and unipolar orders because they combine two features: rule through intermediaries and heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities. These characteristics constitute ideal-typical empires as a form of political organization with particular network properties. Ideal-typical empires comprise a “rimless” hub-and-spoke system of authority, in which cores are connected to peripheries but peripheries themselves are disconnected – or segmented – from one another...When a particular set of relations takes on an imperial cast, a number of important changes occur in the basic dynamics of international politics...

The authors develop this conceptual line in elaborate fashion, and for the most part I find the discussion well-stated and logical (though I do see a couple of inconsistencies in reasoning, but more on that in a moment).

The problem with the article for me is not so much the argument and research (which displays a command of the literature on imperial orders and international hierarchy that is impressive, and that which is beyond what I myself can claim), but rather some not-so-subtle political orientations that seek - I would argue - to elicit greater acceptance for both popular and scholarly references to America as "empire," with all of the deligitimating connotations that accompany such labels.

The authors do note that:

Much of the current debate over American empire concerns normative issues. “Empire” remains a politically charged word, even though a number of advocates of assertive American foreign policy now embrace it...

I see the article as attempting to provide - as effectively and rigorously as possible - a high-brow academic impimatur on such conceptualizations, while at the same time shifting some of the paradigmatic debates in the narrow subfield on international security more toward this "imperial properties" project.

A main point I would raise off the bat is that no matter how elegantly the authors marshall the conceptual apparatus of core-periphery scholarship (based itself in the academic pedigree of neo-Marxist scholarship), the article fails what might be called the "anti-jargon test" of common sense applicability. In other words, it remains incredibly difficult - outside of the narrow set of scholars working on the problems of this research set - to convincingly posit that the United States indeed consitutes an empire.

Not only that, the authors suggest as an implication of their research - starting with an asserted robust applicability of their finding of America as empire - that the Unites States' current difficulties in peripheral conflicts (the Iraq war) herald an ultimate weakening of American power, a situation which further holds great potential for the collapse of America's current unipolar position of international leadership.

Well, note first that the notion of America-as-empire is mostly accepted in elite university faculty lounges and among the rabble of the American street espousing the most vile hard-left anti-Americanism. The great bulk of Americans recognize the United States as the world's unmistakable guarantor of economic and military security, and folks like this really don't cotton to the "imperial" label.

According to Victor Davis Hanson, in his essay, "A Funny Sort of Empire," unlike other great imperial powers of the past - like Rome or Britain - the U.S. has rejected the trappings of imperial grandeur. Here's Hanson example from the mid-20th century:

America went to war late and reluctantly in World Wars I and II, and never finished the job in either Korea or Vietnam. We were likely to sigh in relief when we were kicked out of the Philippines, and really have no desire to return. Should the Greeks tell us to leave Crete — promises, promises — we would be more likely to count the money saved than the influence lost. Take away all our troops from Germany and polls would show relief, not anger, among Americans. Isolationism, parochialism, and self-absorption are far stronger in the American character than desire for overseas adventurism. Our critics may slur us for "overreaching," but our elites in the military and government worry that they have to coax a reluctant populace, not constrain a blood-drunk rabble.

Read more from the Hanson piece to get a fully flavor on the ultimate folly of labeling American foreign policy as an imperialist project.

Other than that, Nexon and Wright's article evinces a couple of inconsistencies in reasoning the impugn the credibility of the research. For example, I was struck by the "strawman-ish" nature of this assertion:

Scholars operating through the lens of unipolarity and hegemony have tremendous difficulties assessing the implications of, for example, the rise of transnational movements opposed to American interests, changes in contractual relationships between the United States and other polities, and rising anti-Americanism throughout the globe.

I really doubt that's the case, or at least it's certainly not true in my own teaching and scholarship. Indeed, the rise of al Qaeda as a formidable terrorist network is facilitated by this said transnationalism, and to the extent that the U.S. has to fear the rise of a peer competitor such as China, we can thank the tremendous degree of increasingly complex international economic interdependence between the U.S., China, and the rest of the world.

Further, the authors' argument that American efforts to pursue "unite and rule" neo-imperial policies in Iraq have been unsuccesful can only be validated by looking at a particular timeframe of the war and the static disposition of military gains and setbacks.

Yet, as of the summer of 2007, most moderate observers in Congress agree that even the limited degree of military success in the new strategy of increased troops combined with more vigorous clear-and-hold tactics has positioned the United States to contemplate a substantial drawdown of America's position in Iraq early next year, without concomitant destablilizing developments in Iraqi politics and security.

I don't think my criticism here will have much effect of the "imperial logics" research project. I would say, though, that I doubt traditional scholarship of balance-of-power theory is in much danger of being supplanted by this research.

Nor do I think that the present argument will have a great deal of sway outside of academe. As Hanson puts it:

Critiques of the United States based on class, race, nationality, or taste have all failed to explicate, much less stop, the American cultural juggernaut. Forecasts of bankrupting defense expenditures and imperial overstretch are the stuff of the faculty lounge. Neither Freud nor Marx is of much help. And real knowledge of past empires that might allow judicious analogies is beyond the grasp of popular pundits.

Add that all up, and our exasperated critics are left with the same old empty jargon of legions and gunboats.

There is an American order in international politics, and that is an order of great power leadership in a realm of nation states that is bound by increasing multilayered patterns of complex interdependence. Empires have been relegated to the ash heap of history, as well they should. Perhaps, with all due respect, this line of research may meet a similar fate some day as well.

Assessing Casualties in Iraq

McClatchy News has responded to the large debate across the blogosphere to its story suggesting a mystery behind the fall of U.S. combat fatalities in Iraq (from Memeorandum):

A story by Pentagon Correspondent Nancy A. Youssef that we published on Sunday sparked a huge outcry in the blogosphere this week. Critics charged that the piece uncritically accepted the Bush administration's line that the surge of additional American troops to Iraq is working and that its statistical underpinning was flawed. McClatchy usually is associated with questioning administration claims, from the reasons for the war to Pentagon assertions about civilian casualties. We've earned a reputation for not accepting something just because someone says it's true, so being accused of uncritical reporting stings. But one of our mottos here is "Truth to Power," and that cuts both ways, so here's a more in-depth look at the story and some of the criticism of it.

The genesis of the story was pretty straight forward. In June, the Pentagon announced that all of the troops involved in the so-called surge finally were in place and that American offensive operations would begin in earnest. Pentagon officials and the White House had predicted that U.S. casualties would rise, especially since the U.S. forces had launched major offensives in Diyala province, north of Baghdad, and Babil province, to the south. One of the most recent restatements of that premise came in the White House's July 12 assessment of progress in Iraq on Pages 3 and 4.

So what happened? Not what had been predicted. U.S. deaths caused by enemy action peaked at 120 (filter by May 2007. Make sure you've clicked on U.S. in the box labeled coalition country) in May, before the surge reached full strength or Operation Phantom Thunder was launched.

Combat casualties then fell consistently for the next three months, reaching a low of 56 in August, (filter by August 2007). That's the lowest number of combat casualties all year. You have to go back to July 2006 to find combat casualties at that level.

That discovery surprised many analysts, as Nancy wrote. Maybe it shouldn't have been such a surprise. Reporters in Iraq had noted a startling lack of U.S. deaths or frustration on the part of soldiers that they weren't finding the gangs of insurgents they'd expected. One British analyst told Nancy that Iraq's armed groups may simply have avoided combat with the Americans. A few days later, a new report from the Government Accountability Office (Pages 42-43) lent credence to that idea.

Of course, some supporters of the surge credited the surge, and Nancy reported that, as well. After all, no one claimed to know precisely why the decline had taken place.

Criticism came from surge supporters, who said McClatchy was bending over backwards to belittle Bush's policy or had joined the "surrender enthusiasts". An example of an email is attached to this story. But the most vitriolic criticism came from liberal Web sites who accused us of doctoring the statistics or of being part of the "as-usual servile and unquestioning mainstream press."

Read the whole thing. McClatchy goes on to note, admirably, that the original story did not evaluate all the possibly causes of the decline. One possible hypothesis is that combat deaths have shown an annual decline in the summer months, and the trend is holding up for summer 2007.

My criticism of the original article noted the twisted unwillingness of the McClatchy author to lend any weight to the new military strategy in Iraq as a cause of decreasing troop deaths: Perhaps with the U.S. routing the enemy, and decimating the ranks of the insurgent nihilists, fewer American forces have been lost.

Jules Crittenden also weighed in, dismissing the argument that the lower troop numbers were not significant because factional fighters in Iraq see the U.S. as irrelevant, and are waiting for America's exit:

Apparently, it’s because the enemy is winning in ways that cannot actually be detected. Or, that the enemy will be winning later, after we surrender. I think that’s what they are trying to say. It couldn’t possibly be because the Bush strategy is more successful than anyone dared suggest it might be.

In fact, there have been some much-heralded spikes in combat deaths as Americans engaged. But the turning of the tribes, a revolt that continues to spread, has dramatically cut violence in ways that were not anticipated when the surge was first announced. Combat operations north and south of the city have been highly successful. Al Qaeda operations in key areas have been terminated, and leadership has fled, attempting to spark bloodshed elsewhere.

It’s a war. Battlefields shift. But sometimes, the taking of territory, defeating the enemy, reducing one’s own losses is actually an indicator of pending victory, rather than defeat. Hard concept to grasp, I know.

Well, it's either a hard concept to grasp, or the hardcore antiwar types just refuse to grasp it. Any sign of impending victory will be rejected by the hardline antiwar types, some of whom showed up in my comment thread, complete with a couple of desperate ad hominems directed my way:

Idiots like Mr. Douglas formulate their conclusions based on ideology and then chase any set of numbers, whether right or wrong, to justify themselves.

Or, at Daily Kos - the leading "progressive" opinion blog - McCatchy's refusal to consider the insurgents' "summer break" from the killing earned the paper the "Judith Miller Excellence in Journalism Award" :

IT appears that American media remain afflicted by the same unquestioning, "sure I'll drink the Koolaid" mentality that was so painfully evident in the New York Times' Judith Miller's horrendously wrong reporting that helped push us into this terrible war to begin with.

This is an interesing debate, with significant consequences. The hard-left forces are desperately trying to reclaim the upper hand in the media spin cycle over progress over the war.

The McClatchy update is noteworthy for highlighting the need for more evidence. That is good, although I'd bet no array of positive indicators would satisfy war opponents. The war's already been lost, they'll say - it's time to bring the troops home and end the "fiasco."

Another Democrat Goes to Damascus

Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich, who is seeking his party's presidential nomination, blasted President Bush and the Iraq deployment during a visit with Syrian strongman Bashir Assad (via Memeorandum):

US Democratic presidential hopeful Dennis Kucinich, on a Mideast visit that included a stop in Syria, said the country lambasted by the Bush administration deserves credit for taking in more than a million Iraqi refugees.

Kucinich, a strong anti-war opponent who trails far in the US presidential polls, also said he won't visit Iraq on his trip to the region because he considers the US military deployment there illegal.

"I feel the United States is engaging in an illegal occupation ... I don't want to bless that occupation with my presence," he said in an interview in Lebanon, after visiting Syria. "I will not do it."

Kucinich, who accused the Bush administration of policies that have destabilized the Mideast, met with Syrian President Bashar Assad during his visit to Damascus. He said Assad was receptive to his ideas of "strength through peace."

He also praised Syria for taking in Iraqi refugees.

And I'm sure Kucinich praised Assad for the arms pipeline he's providing for the transit of materiel from Iran to the Hezbollah thugs in Southern Lebanon.

Calls for diplomacy with Syria may be warranted (at least some have argued), but heaping such praise in a visit to the capital of a state that has allowed the free flow of insurgents in and out of Iraq , while at the same time refusing to make a stop in that country - with perhaps a goodwill gesture to the U.S. service personnel fighting valiantly there - ought to automatically disqualify Kucinich as a serious prospect for president of the United States.

Iraq Combat Deaths Decline: Building a Mystery?

According to this report, U.S. combat fatalities in Iraq have declined in recent months (via Memeorandum). Here's the article's introduction:

American combat deaths in Iraq have dropped by half in the three months since the buildup of 28,000 additional U.S. troops reached full strength, surprising analysts and dividing them as to why.

U.S. officials had predicted that the increase would lead to higher American casualties as the troops "took the fight to the enemy." But that hasn't happened, even though U.S. forces have launched major offensives involving thousands of troops north and south of Baghdad.

American combat casualties have dropped to their lowest levels this year, even as violence involving Iraqis remains high.

Military officials and observers are wondering whether the lower U.S. casualties are a sign of success or an indication that insurgents and militiamen simply chose a different battlefield when the Americans mounted their offensive in Iraq's capital.

"Nobody here is doing cartwheels yet," said one senior military official at the Pentagon, who requested anonymity in order to speak freely.

The piece then goes on, straining to portray the drop in fatalities as a mystery, and cites a "British analyst" who argues that al Qaeda forces see U.S. patrols as "irrelevant."

Much more persuasive is this assessment:

Supporters of the troop increase say the lower casualty figures show that the larger number of troops and the counterinsurgency approach of Gen. David Petraeus, the latest U.S. commander in Iraq, have turned Iraqi citizens against armed groups, putting them on the run and fracturing them.

"The population is progressively turning to coalition and Iraqi forces and making a positive difference in bringing security to their towns, villages and neighborhoods. They are pointing out extremist leaders, identifying caches and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and asking to be a part of the legitimate Iraqi security force," Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, the No. 2 commander, said last month.

Read the whole thing. No matter how one spins the numbers, the decline in combat deaths is an indicator of increasing progress toward security and victory in Iraq. Of course, the media will continue to dig for any information the supports left-wing retreatist talking points.

Thankfully, cooler heads can see through the spin. Check Jules Crittenden's excellent (fair and balanced) analysis of these developments.

The surge is working. Yet, one would be hard-pressed to find news to that effect from the mainstream press.

Iran is Defiant

The New York Times reports that the Iranian regime has ratcheted up its defiant stance against Western demands for the abandonment of its nuclear weapons enrichment program:

Iran’s leaders issued dual, defiant statements on Sunday, with the president announcing that the nation had 3,000 active centrifuges to enrich uranium and the top ayatollah appointing a new Islamic Revolutionary Guards commander who once advocated military force against students.

The pairing of the messages, just days after the United Nations’ top nuclear official said Iran was striking conciliatory poses, appeared intended to reaffirm the country’s refusal to back down to pressure from the United States over its nuclear program and its role in Iraq, political analysts in Iran said. And it came as the Bush administration was celebrating progress in its talks with North Korea to shut down that country’s nuclear programs.

Indeed, the timing and tone of Iran’s declarations may be more politically significant than their content, particularly in the case of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s announcement that Iran had finally reached its stated goal of developing 3,000 centrifuges.

Many technical experts have expressed skepticism over Iran’s periodic claims of enrichment breakthroughs, saying the assertions often turn out to be exaggerated.

That seemed to be the case again on Sunday, though nuclear experts said that even if Mr. Ahmadinejad was overreaching, it would be only a matter of time before the boast became true. The most recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, released Thursday, said Iran had 1,968 centrifuges enriching uranium at its main Natanz plant, 328 in testing, and 328 in assembly — for a total of 2,624. The report noted that the assessment was accurate as of Aug. 19, or two weeks ago.

The goal of 3,000 centrifuges is significant to nuclear experts: they say that if Iran could spin that many centrifuges nonstop for a year, it could make enough highly enriched uranium for a single atom bomb.

But Mohamed ElBaradei, the atomic energy agency director general, said in an interview last week that Iran seemed to be intentionally slowing its progress in an effort to strike a conciliatory note as the United Nations Security Council demanded it stop the nuclear work completely. “My gut feeling,” he said, “is that it’s primarily for political reasons.”

Still, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s new claim was a direct challenge to that notion, and to efforts by the United States and European countries to impose harsher sanctions against Iran. “The West thought the Iranian nation would give in after just a resolution, but now we have taken another step in the nuclear progress and launched more than 3,000 centrifuge machines, installing a new cascade every week,” state television quoted the president as saying.

The White House warned that a new round of sanctions was likely in the wake of Iran’s refusal to cooperate. “This kind of announcement is inconsistent with Iran’s recent comments on cooperation with the I.A.E.A.,” said a spokesman, Robert W. Saliterman.

Read the rest. It's extremely interesting that Iran finds its self-interest in intensifying its rejection of international demands at this time.

There has, of late, been a steady drumbeat of increasingly belligerent statements among the world's great powers. So it seems counterintuitive for Tehran to test international resolve now, just as the West's patience is wearing thin.

I'll be interested to see how radical bloggers spin this story, if they address it all. As I've noted in recent entries, there's an increasing effort among the most fanatical Bush-bashers to demonize the adminstration as hellbent on war (see here and here, for example).

For more, see Michael Van Der Galien, who notes the heightening shrillness to the Bush-demonization project among pro-Iran bloggers.

News From Iraq: Veterans and Dead-Eyed Men

If you haven't visited Acute Politics, an outstanding military blog providing ground-level reports from Iraq, this week's entry was excellent:

It wasn't a good night to have a new LT on patrol. Our LT was was out with us, of course- the new guy would be leading the platoon coming to replace us. We were on a mission that could easily turn bad- as it happened, everyones night but ours was bad. We waited around at a Combat Outpost for hours for our Marine attachments to resolve some equiqment issues, cleared our route, and went home. One of our sister platoons ended up MEDIVACing two men on a helicopter after an IED strike, while another route clearance team out of Falluja was hit multiple times, and an EOD team hit a bomb that flipped a Cougar and sent two techs to the hospital.

The new LT asked "Is it always like this?" His eyes had the dawning realization that he was now at war- that he was about to begin a year of one of the most dangerous jobs in Iraq. The "Oh shit" look, we call it. It's the moment when you realize that these heavy armored trucks are not the panacea that Senators and Army trainers make them appear, not when faced with a determined and ingenious enemy. It's what you get when you see something go wrong for the first time, and the guys around you accept it with a quiet prayer and stoic determination, rather than any outward signs of shock or fear. It's the moment that makes you stop and wonder "Oh shit... what did I get myself into?"

I remember when that moment first came for me - it was right after we got to Ramadi. The Transfer of Authority ceremony had just finished, officially putting my battalion in charge of route clearance operations across a broad swath of western Iraq. I saw an old friend from ROTC back in college, and went over to talk to him. He'd been a platoon leader for the last year, and he looked a hundred years old. The last time I saw him was two years prior, just before he left for his final training as an officer before going to his first command. Then, he'd been lively and vibrant and (dare I say it?) he was a little bit of a dork. Always clowning around, that sort of thing. Now, he looked dead, and I knew that the last year had taken something out of him that the years ahead would be hard pressed to put back in.

The circle has turned, now, as it always does. Now, we are the veterans - the calloused, dead-eyed men who just want to turn over the mission and go home. There's so many things that wear men down - the slow, slippery slope of progress, the questioning and lack of support in news from home, the steady churn replacing wounded (and God forbid, dead) men. The lack of sleep, the hectic stress of changing missions, the broken men, broken families, broken children.

I hope these new guys make it through all right, but for now, we just want to go home.

Head on over there and leave a comment of support. With milblogs like these, folks back home get to know something about the convictions and courage of the military personnel laying their lives on the line for American national security.

The Coming "Bush/Cheney" War Against Iran?

A news report today indicates that the international community has become increasingly frustrated in its efforts to reduce Tehran's support for terrorist violence in Iraq; and that the International Atomic Energy Agency plans to announce the end of its four-year program of inspections in Iran, which has been marked by the government's growing rejection of intrusive review of the country's nuclear development facilities.

At the same time, French President Nicholas Sarkozy yesterday blasted Tehran for its nuclear ambitions, and warned that preventive strikes may be warranted in the face of continued Iranian recalcitrance.

As well, President Bush has warned against the specter of a "nuclear holocaust" should Tehran's authoritarian state develop devastating nuclear capabilities.

This concerted international drumbeat of counter-Iranian diplomacy might be considered a substantial measure of the West's stiffening resolve against Tehran's aggressive designs.

Of course, not everyone would agree with such an interpretation, particularly those on the hard left, who continue to demonize the Bush administration for its alleged fear-mongering and bellicosity.

For example, check out this entry from FireDogLake, which denounces the "Bush/Cheney" regime's rush to war:

Now Bush has described the Iranian regime as posing the threat of a “nuclear holocaust.” Not just a “mushroom cloud.” This time, it’s a nuclear holocaust — terms reserved for the most heinous of crimes and the most despicable of enemies. No sane government engages in such inflammatory rhetoric. But where is the dissent? Where is the outcry?

Throughout this inexorable march to war, the Democratic Congress has done worse than nothing. They’ve voted for resolutions condemning Iran without having the factual basis for knowing what Iran is doing or intends, relying only on neocon and Administration propaganda. They’d listened to dishonest and crazed warmongers like Joe Lieberman, for heaven’s sake. They’ve voted for resolutions that would support regime change, but they’ve refused to pass resolutions or amendments that would require the Administration to seek new authorization to start a war with Iran. Most of our Democratic Presidential candidates — Kucinich and Gravel excepted — have pretended to be “serious” people by refusing to rule out military strikes against Iran, even nuclear strikes. These are not serious positions; they are seriously irresponsible.

But of course, this Administration does not need authorization. It it now operating completely outside the law, outside the Constitution, outside any checks by Congress or influence from those who might counsel against war. By Presidential fiat, it has declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to be a terrorist group, effectively making them an enemy of the US without any Congressional declaration of war. We have a lawless, reckless and belligerent Administration, and it is about to start another unlawful war, even as it tries to convince the American people that it is a good thing that the regime has 160,000 US troops bogged down in another quagmire, vulnerable to an enlarged regional war. Who will tell this crazed regime to stop? To whom would it even listen?

The Administration has repeatedly told us Iran is responsible for many of the deaths of US soldiers in Iraq. They trot out their propagandists in Iraq to shows us the weapons and their markings, suggesting that their use in Iraq is a delberate policy of the Iranian government. Their neocon supporters are already spreading the theme that Iran has effectively declared war on the US by arming and training those who are killing our soldiers in Iraq.

The only thing the Bush/Cheney regime needs is the money to wage its aggressive war against Iran, but how they’ll get it is patently obvious. That money is embedded in the authorizations for supporting US troops and their activities in Iraq. Congress no longer asks what the money is for: it’s assumed to be for “supporting the troops.” Now the regime is asking for another supplemental authorization — another $50 billion — and while Democrats are promising a fight, some are already announcing they will “support the troops” by giving the Administration all the money it requests.

Wake up Democrats: you are being asked to fund an aggressive war against Iran. This war will be on your heads. Stop.

I see an ever-deepening sense of irrational desperation among the hard-line forces of the left. It's almost as if the radical cadres have indicted as imperialists and war criminals all the nations of the Western international order.

And notice the conspiratorial tone of the post: The "unlawful" Bush/Cheney "regime" now operates completely "outside the law." War rumblings are foisted by the "neocons" and the administration's "propagandists." Undue influence is detected among "dishonest and crazed warmongers" such as centrist Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut.

But of course those over at FireDog have the gumption to attack the Democrats for budgeting funds for this "aggressive war against Iran," while at the same time begging the party to "wake up" to the administration's imperialistic project.

It's really too much!

I've noted before that some mainstream policy analysts have suggested that the military option cannot be ruled out, and indeed some have said preventive strikes might be the last, best alternative for decapitating the Iranian nuclear development program.

But hey, a little hard-headed policy analysis is not going to get in the way of a good leftist smear campaign against the Bush/Cheney warmongers in Washington.

After Gonzales: Twilight for the Bush Presidency?

The resignation of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales marks a significant turning point for the Bush administration.

For one thing, Gonzales' exit signals a witch hunt victory for hardline leftists and the Democratic Party (see Memeorandum's Monday blog round up here). In addition, the administration faces a remaining term on the defense, with little recent legislative momentum and an upcoming presidential election season likely to pull attention away from the White House.

This morning's Wall Street Journal has an analysis of the prospects for the Bush administration's remaining lame-duck agenda:

President Bush's loss of another close, longtime aide closes one particularly messy stage of his second term, but suggests a new one may be opening: the lame-duck phase.

That hardly means Mr. Bush is irrelevant, but it does suggest his means for exerting influence are going to be different -- and perhaps clumsier -- from hereon. Increasingly, it appears he will be preoccupied with three objectives: managing the Iraq war; using presidential vetoes to thwart Democratic plans and spending impulses; and advancing a Republican agenda as best he can through regulatory moves and executive actions that skirt congressional inputOver the past several months, the controversy over Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and his firing of eight U.S. attorneys has impeded parts of Mr. Bush's agenda, notably the effort to expand wiretaps of terror suspects. The attorney general chose to use Congress's August recess period to put a stop to such distractions by ending his embattled term.

Over the past several months, the controversy over Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and his firing of eight U.S. attorneys has impeded parts of Mr. Bush's agenda, notably the effort to expand wiretaps of terror suspects. The attorney general chose to use Congress's August recess period to put a stop to such distractions by ending his embattled term.

his August break, though, marks a broader turning point for the Bush presidency. Since Republicans lost control of Congress in last fall's elections, it has been an uphill struggle for Mr. Bush to move big items on his domestic agenda past an uncooperative legislature, or to shake the shadow of the war in Iraq. By his aides' own admission, those tasks will get even more difficult when Congress returns this fall.

Read the whole thing. The White House discounts the notion of declining influence in the remaining months of office:

A White House spokesman, Tony Fratto, rejected the notion that the administration is losing momentum. "The term 'lame duck' is for dime-store political scientists," he said. "It demonstrates a misunderstanding of the power of the presidency, and a miscalculation of the energy and intentions of this president."

He said the White House has an "aggressive" agenda that will address an overhaul of surveillance laws, the Iraq war, spending, education and free trade, and he pointed to solid support among Republicans in Congress for blocking bad legislation, if necessary through upholding vetoes.

Whether the term "lame duck" has much meaning or not, the administration is certainly a far cry from the early-2005, post-reelection era of robust political capital.

Yet, I do think that given the nature of Congress' slim Democratic majority, and the central role the Iraq war will play over the next 15 months, the president is in a good position to set the debate, thwart the Democrats' big spending agenda, and help position GOP candidates for victories at all levels in November 2008.

Public opinion polls show Congress sustaining less public support than the administration. With additional victories in Iraq (and a reasonably good assessment on the war's progress by General Petraeus in September), the Democrats will be desperate to portray the war as a failure, and Bush can hammer their liberal lawmaking agenda with the veto. The appearance of gridlock will consolidate a "do-nothing" image for the "Pelos-tinians" in Congress, and the administration can shift attention to international diplomacy, and can develop an agenda to rebuild America's moral capital in global politics.

Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week

Theo Spark published an excellent guest-post over at Jules Crittenden's yesterday. He discusses the global struggle against fanatical Islamist terrorism, and makes the special case that liberalism itself is a destabilizing fifth column infecting Western societies.

Some of the most hardcore elements of the left are in open alliance with the forces of Islamist totalitarianism. I've blogged about the relationship on occasion.

I'm not sure how well known this ideological-religious alliance is, but I'm pleased to see that David Horowitz's Freedom Center is planning a national series of campus demonstrations to raise awareness on the nature of Islamo-fascism. The events will take place during Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week, scheduled for October 22-26.

Here are the goals of the events:

TO EXPLAIN WHO THE ENEMY IS -- not “terror,” but a fanatical religious movement associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the sponsors of the Muslim Student Association; it is a movement including al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades -- whose common goal is the creation of a global Muslim empire ruled by an Islamic “pope” or caliphate, to be based in Iraq, once America is defeated.

TO COUNTER THE LEFT’S BIG LIE -- that “George Bush created the war on terror,” and to do this by means of campus demonstrations, guest speakers, and documentary films. The speakers will include former Senator Rick Santorum, Robert Spencer, Christopher Hitchens, Nonie Darwish, Wafa Sultan, David Horowitz, Daniel Pipes, Steve Emerson, Frank Gaffney, Cliff May, Phyllis Chessler and Ibn Warraq. The films will include Obsession; Suicide Killers; Border; Islam vs. Islam; and Islam: What the West Needs to Know.

TO PROTEST THE VIOLENT OPPRESSION OF WOMEN IN ISLAM -- the “honor killings,” arranged marriages, child brides, and second-class citizenship of Muslim women.

TO STRENGTHEN THOSE ON CAMPUS WHO REJECT THE ANTI-AMERICAN CURRICULUM OF THE TENURED LEFT which teaches that America is a racist, sexist, homophobic, imperialist “Great Satan” whose little Eichmanns deserve what they get at the hands of Medieval religious fanatics armed with the latest technologies of death.

TO TEACH AN ALTERNATIVE CURRICULUM THAT WILL ARM AMERICA AGAINST THE RADICAL JIHAD – This curriculum will teach that Islam, as currently practiced in Muslim states, oppresses women, gays, Christians, Jews and atheists. It will teach that “Islamo-fascists hate us not because we are oppressors but because we are Christians, Jews, atheists, gays, and liberated women, and because we are tolerant, generous and free."

Check out the whole article. FrontPageMag has called out the Muslim Students Association, a group which has refused to denounce Islamofascism, and one that has close ties to the hardline anti-American organization, International ANSWER.

Apparently the local UCLA chapter of the MSA solicited student donations for the Middle East terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah (during rallies at their "anti-Zionist week").

Further, FrontPageMag notes that a MSA speaker at Queensborough Community College in New York told the crowd "The only relationship you should have with America is to topple it!"

The Geriatrics of U.S. Primacy

Mark Haas has a pathbreaking article on the demographics of America's global preponderance (pdf) in the current issue of International Security.

Haas discusses how global democraphic dynamics will alter the international distribution of capabilities. States with increasingly elderly populations will enjoy less robust economic growth, and larger shares of gross domestic product will be devoted to social welfare programs for the aged. These states will be less likely to mount aggressive foreign policies, and the traditional balancing dynamic in great power politics will be attenuated.

America is not immune from the burdens of a growing population, yet demographic trends in the U.S. imply less geriatric overload than is true of other advanced industrial democracies. This situation should bode well for the perpetuation of American hegemony, although there will be the likelihood of some retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy:

Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states’ economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the otther great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difficulties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be signifcantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely.

I really like this article, especially Haas' discussion of comparatively high rates of fertility and immigration in the U.S. There's much mention in press punditry about how immigration helps sustain America's entitlement system, but there's less attention to how America's open, assimilationist immigration policies in fact sustain American global leadership.

I've argued a number of times here against the renewed "declinism" thesis that has seeped into discussions about America's global leadership role. We will face some important retrenchments in the years after the Bush administration, but a future of continued U.S. global primacy looks likely for some time to come.

See here, here, here, here, and here, for some of my earlier posts on U.S. hegemony.